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Abstract: 
 
Can expansionary fiscal or monetary policy stimulate the U.S. economy in light of recent events?  
Using an Error-Correction-Vectorautoregression, we examine the relative effectiveness of both 
types of governmental stabilization policy. Unlike previous studies, we use a more general error 
correction vectorautoregression (ECM) approach.  Our focus is on determining the relative 
explanatory power of measures of monetary policy (M2 and the Federal Funds Rate) and fiscal 
policy (marginal income tax rates and government spending) in explaining movements in 
consumption, investment, and output.  Results suggest that monetary policy is relatively more 
powerful than fiscal policy.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
he United States federal government, having enjoyed three years of budget surpluses during the late 
1990s, seemed to be on the verge of a new era of expansionary fiscal policy.  Recent events, most 
notably President Bush’s tax cuts, the Iraq War, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have 
prompted renewed discussion of the relative merits and perceived need for discretionary fiscal policy to help prop up 
a somewhat uncertain macroeconomy.  Indeed, the U.S economy has seen vast stimulative fiscal policy since 
President Bush took office in early 2001. 
 
As explained in Taylor [2000], the modern role of fiscal policy in the broader spectrum of stabilization 
policy is largely undetermined, especially given the recent successes of the Federal Reserve in conducting prudent 
monetary policy.  The large federal budget deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s became commonplace, making 
discretionary fiscal policy more politically and financially difficult.  Consequently, during this time period, the 
Federal Reserve focused on fighting inflation and became very successful in managing the macroeconomy 
throughout the longest economic expansion on record.  The economic question remains, however, whether President 
Bush’s immense stimulative fiscal policy is useful, or even merited, during a time when interest rates are at a 40-
year low. 
 
We examine the relative effectiveness of both types of policies in the context of modern time series 
econometrics.  The Federal Funds interest rate was cut over ten times in 2001 and, as of this writing, stands at 1 
percent, its lowest level in over 40 years.  Can and did this aggressive monetary policy help the U.S. recover from its 
most recent recession?  If so, how long does it take for expansionary monetary policy to stimulate the economy?  If 
monetary policy is effective, what is the role of fiscal policy?  
 
Following a brief discussion of our motivation for undertaking this research and an overview of some 
recent studies in Section 2, we outline our econometric methodology and describe our data in Section 3.  Results are 
T 
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presented in Section 4, followed by a conclusion.  In sum, our results indicate that monetary policy is relatively 
more successful than fiscal policy at generating movements in consumption, investment and overall output. 
 
Motivation and Prior Literature 
  
The relative importance of monetary and fiscal policy has been one of the most debated issues in 
economics.  Friedman and Meiselman [1963] found that consumption was correlated with changes in money but not 
fiscal variables, suggesting that monetary policy exerts a stronger impact on taming business cycles than fiscal 
policy.  As noted in Ansari [1996], monetarists used a "St. Louis" style equation to argue against the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy based on its inflationary and crowding-out effects. 
 
In a recent survey of this topic, Taylor [2000] notes that counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy was not 
considered to be an option during the 1960s and 1970s, largely as a result of theorists such as Friedman and 
Meiselman.  During the 1980s and 1990s Federal Reserve monetary policy became more reactive, explicit, and 
systematic towards changes in output and inflation, which may have further diminished the need for fiscal policy. 
 
In contrast, Keynesian economists have long suggested that increases in government spending or income 
tax rate cuts increase aggregate demand, thus eventually increasing output.  Thus, as Nottage [2001] suggests, the 
recent federal income tax cut package may have a stronger direct impact for individuals in the U.S. economy than 
the Federal Reserve interest rate cuts.  
  
A number of earlier studies have examined the impacts of fiscal and monetary policy on various 
aggregates.  This research can be divided into theoretical and empirical analyses.  As examples of the former, Taylor 
[1993] and Blanchard and Perotti [1999] are among those who provide evidence that fiscal policy can affect GDP.  
Additionally, Chari and Kehoe [1998] develop a set of theoretical policy rules that are largely confirmed in Taylor’s 
[2000] recent summary.  Unsurprisingly, though, the body of theoretical research has not reached a consensus 
regarding the relative power and usefulness of fiscal and monetary policy.  
 
 Similarly, the available empirical research has not offered conclusive evidence.  For example, Kim [1997] 
finds that tax system differences across a group of countries are responsible for roughly thirty percent of the 
differences in economic growth across those countries.  Chowdhury [1988] shows that fiscal policy effects are 
different across industrialized countries and very dependent upon institutional factors in each country.  He later 
suggests that increases in government expenditures are fully offset by negative wealth and substitution effects on 
private investments, resulting in expansionary fiscal policy eventually lowering income by crowding out private 
investment.  This may be why Garrison and Lee [1995] find weak support for the negative effect of high marginal 
tax rates on economic growth and no evidence that government spending alters income.   
 
However, in an earlier paper using a vector autoregression (VAR) approach, Chowdhury, Fackler, and 
McMillin [1986] find support for the monetarist view, which suggests that monetary policy generally dominates 
fiscal policy in accounting for unanticipated movements of investment in the United States.  However, Cardia 
[1991] finds that monetary policy and fiscal policy play only a minor role in changing investment, consumption, and 
output.          
 
We build on this literature by investigating the relative predictive power of monetary and fiscal policy for 
changes in aggregate demand using a more general error correction vector autoregression (ECM) approach similar to 
that of Ansari [1996] and Chowdhury et al [1986].  In doing so, we explicitly step back from the longstanding 
theoretical discussion on this topic and let the data speak for themselves.  As an additional contribution, we rely on 
more recent quarterly data, spanning the period from 1966 through 2000. 
 
Estimation Procedure and Data 
 
An empirical investigation into the relative importance of monetary and fiscal policy is perhaps an even 
more relevant exercise in the modern economy, especially given the recent the implementation of large-scale fiscal 
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stimulus packages.  However, as Ansari [1996] notes, the majority of the studies in this literature have used a 
bivariate approach.  This single equation "St. Louis" type makes exogeneity assumptions, which place structural 
causality assumptions onto the model.  Following Chowdhury et al [1986], we employ a VAR technique to avoid 
imposing potentially spurious a priori constraints on the exogeneity of the variables in the system and to allow us to 
incorporate the proper lags of each series.  This helps avoid both a simultaneity and omitted variable bias.  
 
Chowdhury et al [1986] show that the theory underlying the estimation of the VAR is based upon the use of 
stationary data, thus the first step is to determine if each series is stationary.  Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests 
reveal, unsurprisingly, that each of our series has a unit root (i.e., each series is nonstationary).  ADF test results are 
available upon request.  Consequently, we can increase the models’ efficiency by estimating error correction 
autoregressions or ECMs, which incorporate the necessary cointegrating terms to make the system stationary.  To 
determine the proper number of cointegrating terms for the ECMs, we perform Johansen tests for each specification.  
The results of these tests indicate that the insertion of one cointegrating term is necessary to make the system 
stationary.  The cointegrating term is a linear combination of variables in the model, which adds information 
regarding the long-term relationships between these variables, making the results more efficient than a standard 
VAR technique.  An ECM is also a useful method for analyzing the impact of a given variable on itself and on all 
other variables in the system by using forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD), Granger causality tests, and 
impulse response functions (IRF), which can all be seen in the Appendix.  Thus, using the more general approach of 
an error correction vector autoregression (ECM) allows for a direct comparison between the effectiveness of 
monetary and fiscal policy.    
 
Since all ECMs in this paper are estimated using a Cholesky decomposition (to ensure that the covariance 
matrix of the innovations is diagonal), impulse response function results may be dramatically altered depending 
upon the order of equations in the system.  To avoid the potential sensitivity of results to the chosen ordering, all 
models are re-estimated using several alternative orderings.  We have placed policy variables first, with monetary 
policy following a shock to fiscal policy and output last in all reported results in order to maximize the predictive 
power of each type of policy.  It is feasible that a shock to fiscal and/or monetary policy would alter consumption, 
investment and output.  However, we should note in advance that results from all reordered specifications are highly 
robust and are available upon request. 
 
To examine the relative impacts of fiscal and monetary policy, we begin by estimating two separate four-
variable ECMs.  These essentially allow us to determine the all-else-equal impacts of each type of policy, holding 
variables regarding the other type of policy constant.  For fiscal policy, we explore changes in the average federal 
marginal income tax rate (Tax) and real government spending (G), either real investment (I) or real consumption 
(C), and real output (GDP). We then estimate a six-variable ECM with both fiscal and monetary policy variables, 
which enables more direct comparisons between the two policies.  This allows us to test the robustness of our results 
and provides a glimpse at the interrelationships between the policies.   
 
In general, the ECM models that we will be estimating are represented by: 
    
tptpttjtt eyyyyy   ....22110               (1) 
 
where, ty is a vector of endogenous variables (Tax, G, M2, FFR, I, C, and GDP),  is a matrix with elements 
jk such that one or more of the ,0 jk i is a (nxn) coefficients matrices, t 
represents the time period and p represents the lag length, and et is a (nx1) vector of error terms.   
 
We obtain the Tax data from the TAXSIM model, which was created by Feenberg and Coutts, 1993 and 
can be obtained at http://www.nber.org/taxsim.  For monetary policy, we exchange the fiscal policy variables (Tax 
and G) with the seasonally adjusted money supply (M2) and the nominal Federal Funds Rate (FFR) taken from the 
St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank (FRED) Database or http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/.  All other data are reported by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis in 1996 dollars.   
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Results and Discussion  
 
Does fiscal policy help stimulate the economy?  Results in Tables 1 through 6 suggest that fiscal policy 
holds relatively little stimulative power, at least regarding the aggregate U.S. economy.  In contrast to Mitchell 
[2001], who argues that tax reductions of the 1920s, 1960s and 1980s resulted in faster economic growth in the years 
to follow of close to 4-6%, a shock to tax rates appears to explain very little of the innovations in GDP today.  
FEVD results in Table 1 show that a shock to tax rates or government spending explains less than four percent of the 
innovations in GDP.   
 
In fact, impulse response functions in Figures 2 and 4 show that a one-time standard deviation shock to tax 
rates has a relatively small positive impact on GDP.    While this suggests that there is a positive correlation between 
an increase in tax rates and GDP for the first two quarters, it is most likely due to a timing issue.  After the third 
quarter, an increase in tax rates appears to be related to a small reduction in GDP.  The relatively small impact of a 
change in tax rates on output may be due to the infrequency of changes in tax rates, which reduces tax rate volatility 
and their subsequent ability to explain changes in other macroeconomic aggregates.                 
 
Mitchell [2001] also argues that future tax cuts should encourage small business growth and reassure 
consumer confidence, thereby helping to stimulate the economy.  In contrast, our results indicate that tax rates are 
not a good predictor of changes in either investment or consumption.  FEVD results in Tables 1 and 2 show that tax 
changes explain less than eight percent of the innovations in investment and less than three percent of the 
innovations in consumption.  The relatively low predictive power combined with a lack of Granger-causality for 
aggregate demand and its components, shown in Table 7, suggests that while politicians argue that a tax cut will 
help us recover from the current recession, we are not able to provide empirical support to their claims.   
 
While tax cuts do not appear to help tame business cycles, we should note that there are certainly other 
motivations for enacting a tax cut.  These may include but are not limited to reducing dead-weight losses, enhancing 
equity, or achieving other economic or political ends. As Feldstein said in his February 13, 2001 testimony before 
the House Committee on Ways and Means, "Although I do not believe that temporary increases and decreases in tax 
rates are useful for reducing business cycle fluctuations, it is certainly convenient now to have a tax cut that is going 
to be made for other reasons."   
 
Later in his remarks, he suggests "The increase in after-tax incomes and the expectations that such 
increases will continue in the future will boost confidence as well as spending power."  However, results in this 
paper find that a shock to tax rates or government spending will have very little influence on consumer or 
investment spending.    
 
Results also find that fiscal policy has very little influence on output.  Thus, even though the U.S. is 
experiencing one of its largest tax reductions paired with an increase in government spending, it may have very little 
effect on helping stimulate the U.S. economy.  FEVD results in Tables 1 and 2 show that a shock to government 
spending never explains more than three percent of the variation in GDP or its components.  This contradicts the 
FEVD results found by Ansari [1996] who found that a shock to government spending explained close to a fourth of 
the movement in India's GDP.       
 
Impulse response functions and Granger causality tests support the lack of fiscal policy's influence on real 
variables.  While Figure 1 shows that an increase in government spending displays a negative relationship with 
private spending, the influence of increases in public spending appears small.  Similarly, changes in public 
(government) spending do not Granger cause changes in private (investment) spending.  Collectively, this suggests 
that there is very little "crowding out."          
 
What, then, happens to investment, consumption, and output when the Federal Reserve Bank alters 
monetary policy?  Results show that while fiscal policy has very little influence on taming business cycles, monetary 
policy does predict changes in consumption, investment and output.  Our four-variable ECMs show that M2 has a 
strong, growing influence on changes in consumption, investment and output.  FEVD results in Table 3 reveal that 
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M2 explains close to a third of the innovations in investment and up to a fourth of the innovations in GDP.  
Similarly, the FFR explains close to fifteen percent of consumption and investment behavior and ten percent of the 
output behavior.   
 
Impulse response functions in Figures 5-8 reinforce the positive and growing impact that expansionary 
monetary policy displays for aggregate demand and its components.  In contrast, using annual data from 1960 to 
1985 Cardia [1991] finds that increases in M1 create a reduction in consumption due to its inflationary tax effects.  
Granger-causality results further show that M2 and the FFR Granger cause consumption, investment and output.  It 
appears that increases in M2 and reductions in the FFR precede increases in consumption, investment and output, 
suggesting that monetary policy may help stimulate the U.S. economy.   
 
The results of our six-variable specification continue to suggest that monetary policy has a much stronger 
impact on real variables than fiscal policy, regardless of the ordering.  Changes in monetary policy continue to be a 
good predictor of changes in investment, consumption, and GDP, while changes in the tax rate and government 
spending appear to have very little influence on taming business cycles.  FEVD Tables 5 and 6 reinforce earlier 
results showing that M2 continues to explain close to a third of the innovations in investment and output behavior 
and that the FFR continues to explain close to fifteen percent of investment and output.  Again, this result is also 
seen in the impulse response functions reported in Figures 9 and 10.   
 
Conclusions 
  
This paper presents new evidence regarding the relative importance of monetary and fiscal policy for 
taming business cycles in the U.S.  Using quarterly data from 1966 to 2000, we estimate a series of error correction 
vector autoregressions to determine the predictive power of changes in tax rates, government spending, M2, and 
FFR in explaining movements in consumption, investment and GDP.  Forecast error variance decompositions and 
impulse response functions support the relative importance of monetary policy.  As Taylor [2000] suggests this may 
be due to the Fed executing a more aggressive and successful monetary policy since the 1980s, which may reduce 
the need for fiscal policy.  
 
 To be sure, our data contain few experiences with discretionary fiscal policy explicitly aimed at stabilizing 
the macroeconomy.  Consequently, our results are only suggestive and should not be interpreted as an outright 
dismissal of fiscal policy.  Furthermore, we would emphasize the other important goals of tax and expenditure 
policy, namely to improve general equity and efficiency in the economy.  It would be most fortunate if fiscal policy 
could achieve these primary goals while also serving to stimulate a weak economy as a side effect.  In terms of 
quick, easy-to-implement policies aimed at taming macroeconomic fluctuations, though, it appears that monetary 
policy reigns supreme. 
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Appendix: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (Fevd) Results 
 
 
Table 1 FEVD of Investment (I) and Output (GDP) w/Tax and G from 1966.Q1 to 2000.Q4 
 
Horizon Investment (I) Output (GDP) 
 TAX G I GDP TAX G I GDP 
2 Quarters 2 0 98 0 1 3 41 45 
4 Quarters 3 0 96 0 1 2 49 49 
6 Quarters 5 0 94 1 1 1 56 42 
8 Quarters 7 0 92 2 2 1 59 38 
 
 
Table 2 FEVD of Consumption and Output (GDP) w/Tax and G from 1966.Q1 to 2000.Q4 
 
Horizon Consumption (C) Output (GDP) 
 TAX G C GDP TAX G C GDP 
2 Quarters 0 2 98 0 2 3 26 69 
4 Quarters 1 1 97 2 1 2 33 64 
6 Quarters 1 1 94 4 1 1 32 66 
8 Quarters 2 1 92 6 1 1 47 51 
 
 
Table 3 FEVD of Investment (I) and Output (GDP) w/M2 and FFR from 1966.Q1 to 2000.Q4 
 
Horizon Investment (I) Output (GDP) 
 M2 FFR I GDP M2 FFR I GDP 
2 Quarters  20 3 77 0 4 7 38 51 
4 Quarters 30 6 64 0 13 3 44 39 
6 Quarters 34 13 53 0 24 5 40 30 
8 Quarters 33 20 46 1 28 10 37 24 
 
 
Table 4 FEVD of Consumption and Output (GDP) w/M2 and FFR from 1966.Q1 to 2000.Q4 
 
Horizon Consumption (C) Output (GDP) 
 M2 FFR C GDP M2  FFR C GDP 
2 Quarters 7 3 90 1  2 7 37 53 
4 Quarters 10 6 83 1 10 4 50 37 
6 Quarters 11 12 76 1 16 7 52 25 
8 Quarters 10 16 74 0 17 13 53 17 
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Table 5 FEVD of I with Fiscal and Monetary Policy from 1966.Q1 to 2000.Q4 
 
Horizon Investment 
 TAX G M2 FFR I GDP 
2 Quarters  0  1  25  2  71  1 
4 Quarters  0  0  38  13  47  2 
6 Quarters  0  0  39  25  35  1 
8 Quarters  0  0  34  35  30  1 
 
 
Table 6 FEVD of GDP w/I, Fiscal and Monetary Policy from 1966.Q1 to 2000.Q4 
 
Horizon GDP 
 TAX G M2 FFR I GDP 
2 Quarters  1 6 5 4 34 50 
4 Quarters 1 4 19 4 30 42 
6 Quarters 0 2 30 9 24 35 
8 Quarters 0 2 32 15 23 28 
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Table 7:  Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  FFR does not Granger Cause M2 142 3.16868* 0.01595 
  M2 does not Granger Cause FFR 9.50139* 8.7E-07 
  TAX does not Granger Cause M2 134 3.05114* 0.01942 
  M2 does not Granger Cause TAX 0.72072 0.57933 
  G does not Granger Cause M2 141 1.82943 0.12689 
  M2 does not Granger Cause G 4.08829* 0.00372 
  I does not Granger Cause M2 141 5.63942* 0.00032 
  M2 does not Granger Cause I 4.54515* 0.00180 
  C does not Granger Cause M2 141 3.53690* 0.00892 
  M2 does not Granger Cause C 1.68550 0.15709 
  GDP does not Granger Cause M2 141 3.98887* 0.00435 
  M2 does not Granger Cause GDP 2.88273* 0.02506 
  TAX does not Granger Cause FFR 134 1.02549 0.39686 
  FFR does not Granger Cause TAX 2.05394* 0.09084 
  G does not Granger Cause FFR 141 0.51770 0.72285 
  FFR does not Granger Cause G 0.36182 0.83541 
  I does not Granger Cause FFR 141 2.22642* 0.06954 
  FFR does not Granger Cause I 12.4411* 1.3E-08 
  C does not Granger Cause FFR 141 2.35785* 0.05680 
  FFR does not Granger Cause C 9.46847* 9.2E-07 
  GDP does not Granger Cause FFR 141 2.85611* 0.02613 
  FFR does not Granger Cause GDP 8.04121* 7.8E-06 
  G does not Granger Cause TAX 134 2.50419* 0.04557 
  TAX does not Granger Cause G 1.92732 0.10995 
  I does not Granger Cause TAX 134 0.64201 0.63353 
  TAX does not Granger Cause I 1.45313 0.22053 
  C does not Granger Cause TAX 134 0.53212 0.71235 
  TAX does not Granger Cause C 1.09340 0.36281 
  GDP does not Granger Cause TAX 134 0.28340 0.88828 
  TAX does not Granger Cause GDP 0.40503 0.80474 
  I does not Granger Cause G 141 1.45214 0.22047 
  G does not Granger Cause I 0.87900 0.47847 
  C does not Granger Cause G 141 1.24719 0.29417 
  G does not Granger Cause C 0.70421 0.59042 
  GDP does not Granger Cause G 141 1.35444 0.25328 
  G does not Granger Cause GDP 0.39308 0.81331 
  C does not Granger Cause I 141 3.58239* 0.00830 
  I does not Granger Cause CONSUMPTION 1.83664 0.12554 
  GDP does not Granger Cause I 141 1.81040 0.13055 
  I does not Granger Cause GDP 9.41167* 1.0E-06 
  GDP does not Granger Cause C 141 1.17394 0.32526 
  C does not Granger Cause GDP 9.32623* 1.1E-06 
* Hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level.   
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Appendix B: Impulse Response Functions 
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Notes 
